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IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law is a vibrant community of scholars. Each year we welcome new visiting
professors of legal writing and fellows with a variety
of specialties. These programs are intended to provide
the time, space, mentoring, and resources needed
to launch academic careers, while we reap the benefit of their energy, enthusiasm, friendship, and new
approaches. In this issue, we focus on the innovative
work of some of these junior scholars, and juxtapose
them with one of the most renowned and senior members of our faculty. We are particularly excited that, as
intended, some of our junior scholars will be moving
to new faculties. We will miss them, but we wish them
the very best of luck. In the coming months, the cycle
will continue, and new junior scholars will join us as
we continue to expand our scholarly impact.
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{Climate Change}

Addressing
climate change
Domestic innovation,
international aid and
collaboration

published in N.Y.U. Journal of Intellectual Property
& Entertainment Law
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Joy Y. Xiang
IP Fellow
BS, University of Washington
JD, University of Washington

J

oy Xiang’s expertise is in global patent practice, patent counseling, patent procurement
and portfolio development. She has worked in the high-tech industry since 1996, in roles
such as software engineer and program manager for Motorola and later as in-house counsel
for Microsoft.
Ms. Xiang was educated in law, public policy, technology entrepreneurship, and computer science. After practicing law for 10 years, she appreciates being in academia, where she
can use her accumulated learning and experiences and expand her understanding through research and discussions with students and colleagues. Ms. Xiang’s research currently focuses on
exploring ways to enhance systems and communities for better innovation and collaboration.
For more, visit her faculty webpage here.

Addressing Climate
Change

Domestic Innovation, International Aid and
Collaboration
By Joy Y. Xiang

“[T]he question before us is no longer the nature of the
challenge – the question is our capacity to meet it.”
- Barack Obama

I

n December 2009, at the 15th global climate change conference in Copenhagen, leaders from 115 nations gathered to
negotiate an international agreement for addressing climate
change. The agreement was expected to include provisions to
enhance the international transfer of technologies capable of
adapting to or mitigating climate change. Unfortunately, the
talks stalled. Developed and developing nations disagreed on
a host of issues, especially the treatment of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) protecting clean technologies. Even before
the Copenhagen conference, developing nations proposed to
exclude clean technologies held by developed nations from
patent protection. Developed nations, meanwhile, considered
that IPR should not be part of the global climate change negotiations and proposed to remove provisions dealing with IPR
from the negotiations.
The Copenhagen conference resulted in a non-binding

An excerpt from Addressing Climate Change: Domestic Innovation, International Aid and
Collaboration, 5 N.Y.U. Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law 196 (2015).
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agreement that did not reference IPR
issues. Nevertheless, the debate regarding
IPR persisted through the subsequent
global climate change negotiations. The
global climate change conference, held
in Lima in December 2014, presented
both developed nations’ and developing
nations’ positions regarding IPR as equal
options to be negotiated at the next global climate change conference in Paris in
December 2015. The agreement resulting
from the 2015 Paris conference, however,
did not mention IPR issues; just as in the
Copenhagen conference, the preference
of developing nations was not reflected.

T

he debate regarding the treatment of
IPR in the climate change context

Property Organization (“WIPO”), the
United Nations Environmental Programme (“UNEP”), the World Meteorological Organization, and the World Bank
have all initiated discussions to resolve the
divide. The stakeholders in this discussion
include governments, public entities, and
commercial entities from developed and
developing nations, and those with interests in combatting climate change. To
date, these shareholders are still searching
for effective solutions.
As discussed in Part I.B, addressing
climate change is a pressing issue; in
order to meet the 2°C goal, we need to
reduce 60% of the anthropogenic GHG
emissions by 2050, using 2000 as a base
line. Rapid development and deployment

“[A]n ongoing divide exists between developing
and developed nations regarding the role of IPR in
the international transfer of clean technologies for
addressing climate change.”
breaks down as follows: developed nations
insist on strong IPR for clean technologies, viewing IPR as indispensable for
incentivizing the development of such
technologies and facilitating their deployment. Conversely, developing nations
have sought to weaken or even remove
IPR for clean technologies, viewing the
existence of IPR as a major barrier to the
international transfer of clean technologies.
Hence, an ongoing divide exists between developed and developing nations
regarding the role of IPR in the international transfer of clean technologies for
addressing climate change. International
agencies such as the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the World Intellectual
[ 7 ] IIT Chicago-Kent Faculty Perspectives

of clean technologies to meet this goal requires developed and developing nations
to act independently and collaboratively.
In the past two decades, global climate change technology efforts have focused on the transfer of clean technologies
from developed nations to developing
nations. The UNFCCC system and the
TRIPS Agreement have provided multiple mechanisms to promote such transfer.
However, the international transfer of
clean technologies to developing nations
has been limited, especially to the least
developed countries (“LDC”s) and the
mid-tier developing nations (“MDC”s).
As shown in the figure below, most transfers occur among developed nations, and
the transfers to developing nations have
spring 2016 [ 7 ]
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mostly gone to the emerging economies.

O

ne may ask: why has transfer of clean
technologies to developing nations
been limited? Is the existence of IPR in fact
a major barrier to the international transfer of clean technologies? After reviewing
and analyzing currently available data on
clean technologies and scholarship regarding international technology transfer, this
article finds that the existence of IPR has
not been a major barrier to the international transfer of clean technologies. This
article also finds that for a nation to attract
inbound transfer of foreign technologies,
it needs to offer: sufficient IPR protection,
the capacity to absorb and adopt foreign
technologies, sufficient market size, policy
certainty, and transparency. Likely due to
a lack of some of such capacity, most developing nations – e.g., the LDCs and the
MDCs – have had difficulties attracting
foreign clean technologies.
As the analysis in Part II.A shows,
the existence of IPR has not been a major
roadblock for the transfer of clean tech-
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nologies to developing nations. Instead,
lack of proper IPR protection for clean
technologies may impede the international transfer of clean technologies. Commercial sectors in developed nations play
a significant role in the development and
transfer of clean technologies, and they
are concerned about losing their control
of the technologies to be transferred if
developing nations do not offer proper
IPR protections. Therefore, developing
nations need to offer IPR in order to
attract inbound transfer of clean technologies. However, developing nations
should be allowed to customize their IPR
protections to address the realities of their
countries’ economic development. Strong
IPR protections may not benefit all developing nations equally. For developing
nations that currently rely on duplicative
imitation of foreign practices for technology development, strong IPR protections
will likely inhibit such practice and hence
the growth of domestic industries.
Meanwhile, IPR is just one of the
conditions enabling developing nations
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to attract inbound transfer of clean technologies. According to the analysis in Part
II.B, in order to attract inbound transfer
of foreign clean technologies, a developing
nation also needs to have certain capacity.
Such capacity includes a good investment
environment (such as market conditions,
policy clarity and transparency), openness to trade for attracting international
technology transfer, and domestic scientific infrastructure and human capital
for absorbing and implementing foreign
technologies into the local production
process.

D

eveloped nations can help developing nations – especially the MDCs
and the LDCs – build up the capacity
to attract and implement foreign clean
technologies. Because of climate change’s
global impact and developed nations’ historical contributions to climate change,
developed nations have the self-interest
and moral duty to help developing nations
address climate change, e.g., via international aid. Furthermore, the governments
of developed nations can set up domestic
initiatives and mechanisms to encourage
their commercial sectors to transfer clean
technologies to developing nations.
This article proposes that domestic
innovation, international aid and international technology collaboration should
be the focus, rather than international
transfer of clean technologies, in order
to effectively address climate change via
clean technologies. The proposal aims to
encourage the rapid and sustainable development and deployment of clean technologies, while addressing the factors that
likely have induced the limited amount of
transfer of clean technologies to developing nations during the past two decades.
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The proposed solution has three
prongs. First, both developed nations
and developing nations should stimulate
domestic innovations on clean technologies by leveraging diverse tools for
encouraging innovations. This includes
developed nations optimizing their IPR
systems to encourage advancements in
clean technologies, along with developing
nations building customized IPR systems
reflecting their national realities. Second,
developed nations and even the emerging
economies should provide financial and
technical aid to developing nations, especially the MDCs and the LDCs, to help
them combat climate change and build
the sustainable national capacity to attract, absorb and implement foreign clean
technologies. Third, when applicable,
developed nations and developing nations
should construct collaboration platforms
for clean technology developments that
would benefit both parties.
In summary, the focus on the international transfer of clean technologies to
developing nations in order to address climate change has not worked well during
the past two decades. This article analyzes
evidential data on clean technologies and
their transfer and finds that the existence
of IPR has not been a major barrier to
such transfer, as suggested by developing
nations during the debates with developed
nations on how to improve the situation.
This article also studies possible reasons
for the currently limited transfer of clean
technologies to developing nations and
concludes that developed and developing
nations need to work together to improve
the situation. Specifically, developing
nations need to improve their national
capacities in attracting, absorbing, and
implementing foreign clean technologies,
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and developed nations have the moral
duty and self-interest to provide concrete
and effective assistance to developing
nations in building such capacities and
in helping developing nations address
climate change. By understanding and
addressing these possible reasons, this article proposes that we focus on domestic
innovation of clean technologies, international aid and collaboration, instead
of international transfer of clean technologies. This approach makes possible and
sustainable the needed rapid development
and deployment – including international
transfer – of clean technologies, which
is essential for us to successfully address
climate change.

[ 10 ] IIT Chicago-Kent Faculty Perspectives

Joy Y. Xiang
Selected Publications
Books
Climate Change and Technology Transfer: Innovation, Collaboration, and International Aid (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming 2017).

Articles
How Wide Should the Gate of Technology Be
-- Business Method Patentability in China, 11
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 795 (2002).
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Biology, Genetics,
Nurture, and the Law
The expansion of the Legal
Definition of Family to Include
Three or More Legal Parents

published in Nevada Law Journal
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Myrisha S. Lewis
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
AB, Harvard University
JD, Columbia University School of Law

M

yrisha Lewis teaches legal writing at Chicago-Kent and specializes in areas related to
family law and criminal law. Prior to joining the Chicago-Kent faculty in 2015, she
spent approximately four years as an attorney at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
in Rockville, Maryland. There, she filed pleadings on behalf of agency staff, advised legal and
technical staff on federal rulemakings and statutes, and reviewed staff analyses of new nuclear
power reactor licenses and designs. While employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Professor Lewis also completed a seven-month detail in the Sex Offense and Domestic
Violence Section of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington, D.C., as a Special Assistant U.S.
Attorney, where she prosecuted domestic violence misdemeanor cases.
	Professor Lewis’ research and teaching interests include family law, criminal law, comparative constitutional law, European Union law, administrative law, trusts and estates, bioethics, and torts. Her articles have been published in the Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender
and Society and the Charleston Law Review. She has a forthcoming article in the Nevada Law
Journal.
	Professor Lewis earned a law degree from Columbia Law School and an A.B. in Government from Harvard University. During law school, she was a case law editor of the Columbia Journal of European Law and a teaching assistant for a seminar on International Environmental Law. Professor Lewis is a member of the New York Bar and speaks French and Spanish.
For more, visit her faculty webpage here.
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Biology, Genetics,
Nurture, and the Law

The Expansion of the Legal Definition of Family to
Include Three or More Legal Parents
By Myrisha S. Lewis

I

n 2000, the United States Supreme Court
noted that “[t]he demographic changes of
the past century make it difficult to speak
of an average American family.” As a result of
these demographic changes, “[m]any children are
now raised in non-conventional settings.” These
“non-conventional settings” include settings occupied by stepfamilies, single parents, extended
family members, individuals who are not genetically or biologically related to the children,
and same-sex partnerships and marriages. On June
26, 2015, the Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell
v. Hodges that the fundamental right to marry applies to same-sex couples. In doing so, the
Court noted that a “basis for protecting the
right to marry is that it safeguards children
and families.” While children of same-sex couples will now benefit from the recognition of
their parents’ marital relationships and the resulting legal protection of their parent-child

An excerpt from Biology, Genetics, Nurture, and the Law: The Expansion of the Legal
Definition of Family to Include Three or More Legal Parents, 16 Nevada Law Journal 743
(2016).
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relationships, these children, and other
children of “non-conventional settings,”
will continue to form relationships with
individuals who are “parents” from the
children’s perspective, but not legally. Such
relationships still need protection and “safeguarding.”

T

he legal implications of these aforementioned “non-conventional settings”
have been at issue in several other Supreme
Court cases including: Michael H. v. Gerald
D., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, and
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. As a result,
the law has had to adapt to recognize new

parent is biologically (or genetically) related
to the child;
4. Marriage, as evidenced by the marital presumption, which purports that the
husband is the father of a child born into
the marriage; and
5. Functional or de facto parentage,
which is based on a putative parent’s actions.
These many bases for parentage, combined with the realities of reproduction,
cohabitation, and family interaction, are
the reason why children can have more than
two parents. In many states, however, to
have three instead of two parents is legally
impossible. For example, statutory restric-

[“Limiting the number of parents a child can have
is noticeably disadvantageous for a child with three
fit, putative parents, as the child would be deprived
of a parent-child relationship.”]
foundations for parentage and will likely
continue to do so.
Currently, there are at least five bases for
recognizing parentage:
1. Biology, as evidenced by the presumption that a woman who gives birth to a
child is that child’s parent;
2.	Genetics, which is recognized by
the Uniform Parentage Act and is most important in the recognition (or disproving) of
paternity;
3.	Intent, which is recognized in certain jurisdictions such as California, where a
court will conclude—especially when assisted-reproductive technology is at issue—that
the “parties who had contracted for and intended the pregnancy . . . were [the child’s]
legal parents and had support obligations
that flowed therefrom,” even though neither

[ 14 ] IIT Chicago-Kent Faculty Perspectives

tions may require the demonstration of one
or two legal parents’ unfitness as parents
before a third party can be granted parental
rights; these restrictions also prevent the
assertion of de facto parenthood. Limiting
the number of parents a child can have is
noticeably disadvantageous for a child with
three fit, putative parents, as the child would
be deprived of a parent-child relationship.
Indeed, without the legal recognition of
full parentage, children may be deprived of
important sources of financial support and
contact with their perceived parents, which
may be traumatic to them.
In light of social and demographic
changes during the past century, this article
seeks to resolve the questions of who should
be recognized as a parent and what the criteria for legal recognition of parentage should
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be. Many other articles focus solely on the
parental rights of a group that is marginalized when it comes to legal recognition of
their significant roles in a child’s life, such
as the rights of grandparents, lesbians, samesex parents, or stepparents. Similarly, the
literature that focuses on children’s rights as
related to parental recognition tends to classify children by certain subsets, focusing, for
example, on the rights of children of samesex couples. This article departs from the existing literature’s approach, instead addressing stepparent adoption, same-sex couples,
grandparent visitation, and assisted reproductive technology by creating a solution
from the perspective of the “best interests of
the child”—the historical leading standard
in children’s protection—rather than from
the perspective of the parents’ rights. It is
likely that legislatures are not familiar with
exactly how the best interests of the child
standard operates in practice because it is a
family law standard that generally arises in
an adjudicatory context. This legislative unfamiliarity should not prevent state legislatures from including provisions in parentage
statutes and hopefully conducting legislative
inquiries into the best interests of the child
through expert testimony and research.

D

rawing from the best interests of the
child standard, this article introduces
a new doctrine for parental recognition,
“parentage in praxi,” which requires (1) that
a putative parent complete statutorily delineated requirements that culminate in them
standing “in the shoes of a parent,” and (2)
that state law operate to allow a child to
have more than two parents—if doing so
would be in the best interests of the child. A
parent in praxi would have the same rights
and obligations as a legal parent. This article
borrows Professor Susan Frelich Appleton’s
term of “original parent” to refer to the
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parents that the law currently identifies as
legal parents (those parents who are deemed
parents when the child is born). By recognizing parentage in praxi, states can protect
the relationships that children have formed
with putative parents who may not be currently recognized as legal parents, regardless
of the parents’ legal status in any sphere not
concerning the well-being of the child (e.g.,
marital status, familial status, or gender).
A discussion of parental rights in the
context of the best interests of the child
is inescapable. Parents have certain enumerated rights and responsibilities that are
constitutionally recognized. Professor Susan Frelich Appleton noted that “the [U.S.
Supreme] Court has ‘recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children,’” which led her to conclude
that “[t]he Supreme Court has reaffirmed
the primacy of parental rights under the
Due Process Clause.” Other scholars note,
Going back to the 1920s in cases like
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, the Supreme Court has held that
parents have a fundamental constitutional
right to raise their children without state
interference. Custody orders, public school
policies, or other state action that sharply
limit the child-rearing role of either parent,
the argument goes, substantially burden
that right, triggering strict judicial scrutiny.
And, under strict scrutiny, the state must
show some “compelling interest”—such as
imminent harm to the child—to justify its
intervention. Incantation of more amorphous interests, including the “best interests” of children, is insufficient.
Yet, the best interests of the child are
frequently considered in state actions such
as custody orders that could be viewed
as limiting the role of a parent. Custody
orders are commonplace. When there are
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multiple parents, they must share their
parental rights and responsibilities, and
the recognition of a second or third parent
does not upset the constitutional balance
between parental rights and the best interests of the child. The child has a right to
maintain emotional bonds with multiple
legally-recognized parents, and it is generally in the child’s best interest to do so.

P

arentage in praxi draws its origins from
de facto parentage, which will be explained in the Introduction of this article.
Part I discusses the best interests of the child
standard and the role of a parent. Part II conducts an in-depth analysis of statutory and
doctrinal de facto parentage (the doctrine
upon which parentage in praxi is based)
and other doctrines that recognize individuals’ functional parental roles, including the
Uniform Parentage Act, in loco parentis,
psychological parentage, and visitation.
Throughout Part II, the theory of parentage
in praxi is expanded, and it is compared to
existing legal doctrines for the preservation
of third parties’ rights. This comparison
also highlights some of the drawbacks of
parentage in praxi and other doctrines, then
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builds upon these drawbacks. Part IV briefly
explores the possibility of children actually
having three genetic parents, made possible
by scientific techniques pending approval in
the United States and recently approved for
human subjects trials in the United Kingdom.
Myrisha S. Lewis
Selected Publications
Articles
Sex and Statutory Uniformity: Harmonizing the
Legal Treatment of Semen, 7 Charleston Law Review 235 (2012-13).
Making Sex the Same: Ending the Unfair Treatment of Males in Family Law, 27 Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & Society 257 (2012).
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Seth C. Oranburg
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
BA, University of Florida
JD, The University of Chicago Law School

S

eth Oranburg’s scholarship focuses on areas related to business law. Before joining the
Chicago-Kent faculty in 2015, he taught courses on Corporations, Closely Held Business
Organizations, and Electronic Discovery of Digital Evidence at the Florida State University
College of Law. Professor Oranburg’s practice experience includes corporate venture capital
transactions in Silicon Valley, CA, and antitrust litigation in Washington, DC.
	Professor Oranburg’s scholarship in business law includes crowdfunding, securities
regulations, and shareholder activism. He has recently published articles in the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, the Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy, and the Rutgers
University Law Review. He also has written for the Columbia Law School Blue Sky Blog and
been interviewed by the Wall Street Journal and AboveTheLaw.com.
	Professor Oranburg graduated with honors from the University of Chicago Law
School, where he was a member of the Order of the Coif and a Kirkland & Ellis Scholar. He
earned his bachelor’s degree from the University of Florida, magna cum laude, with a double
major in political science and English. Professor Oranburg is a member of the State Bar of
California and the Bar of the District of Columbia.
For more, visit his faculty webpage here.
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Democratizing Startups
Private Independent Analysts
By Seth C. Oranburg

S

upporters of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act of 2012, such as President
Barack Obama, claim that law will democratize
startups by “help[ing] entrepreneurs raise the capital
they need to put Americans back to work and create
an economy that’s built to last.” The law might accomplish this by allowing startups to sell crowdfunding
stock directly to the general public through Internet
portals. But the JOBS Act does not provide a way
for investors to resell crowdfunding stock. Investors
must hold crowdfunding stock until the company goes
public (or otherwise liquidates), which could take
ten years or more. With so much uncertainty in the
interim, investors have good reasons to be skeptical
and not buy crowdfunding stock under the JOBS Act.
This Article advocates that democratizing startups requires allowing resale of crowdfunding stock.
This Article proposes “Rule 144B,” a regulatory provision that could be enacted without an act of Congress,
to permit transparent web-based venture exchanges

A summary of Democratizing Startups, 68 Rutgers University Law Review (forthcoming 2016).

spring 2016 [ 19 ]

Seth C. Oranburg

with
fraud-prevention
intermediaries termed “private independent analysts” to resell crowdfunding stock.

T

o create a resale exemption that works,
scholars and regulators first need to
understand what could cause such a resale
market to fail. The failure of past venture
exchanges—platforms where private-company stock can be traded—can be attributed to the fact that companies on venture
exchanges have the corporate governance
problems of both private corporations and
public corporations, with few of the benefits. On one hand, exchange participants
lack the investor protections typically found
in VC arrangements, such as active monitoring and restrictive covenants that protect
against information asymmetries and entrepreneurs’ opportunism. On the other hand,
exchange participants lack the information
typically provided by public company listing requirements. The information problem
is compounded by the fact that exchanges
may lack incentives to require their listed
companies to make disclosures or to police those disclosures for completeness and
accuracy. Crowdfunding investors may be
especially vulnerable to these problems because they are not necessarily accredited or
sophisticated.
Instead of taking on the worst problems
of both VC-funded and publicly-traded
companies, this Article proposes that a
“144B” exchange could be used to incentivize corporations seeking liquidity to adopt
corporate governance that reflects their most
successful practices. Therefore, the crux of
the 144B exchange must be to return the
power of monitoring and disciplining
management to the stockholders. This can
be accomplished by installing a quasi-VC
called the “private independent analyst” or
“PIA.” The PIA would represent the shareholders on the venture exchange much like
a VC manager represents the members of its

[ 20 ] IIT Chicago-Kent Faculty Perspectives

VC fund, except the PIA’s compensation is
not based on stock performance. Rule 144B
could require all companies listed on a 144B
exchange to provide contractual control
rights to the PIA, similar to those found in
VC contracts. For example, the PIA would
have the right to attend board meetings,
vote on fundamental corporate transactions
(including mergers, major acquisitions, and
sales of substantially all assets), prevent the
company from issuing more stock, prevent
the company from taking on a large senior
debt, and vote on management salaries.
In addition to contractual control rights
that are similar to what a VC would receive,
the PIA would also have responsibilities to
produce valuable public information. In
the public-company context, stock analysts
review publicly available information and
often have private access to corporate management. The analyst reviews corporate and
systemic information, and reports whether
the company is correctly valued by its stock
price. This is a valuable service because it
centralizes efforts that would otherwise
have to be duplicated by all stockholders.
This reduces the cost of monitoring a corporation and reduces shareholders’ rational
apathy problems. Analyst reports are integral to overcoming corporate governance
problems, but it is hard for smaller firms to
attract analyst coverage. By requiring 144B
exchange-traded companies to produce analyst reports, the micro-cap companies on
144B exchanges could actually have fewer
corporate governance problems than smallcap companies on national stock exchanges.
Applying the PIA model to 144B
exchanges potentially solves the most serious problem faced by venture exchanges.
Venture exchanges may become a “market
for lemons” if companies use the venture
exchange as a staging ground to catapult
into better-regarded markets. The most
successful companies on a venture exchange
may transfer to a better-regarded exchange
spring 2016 [ 20 ]
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in order to signal that the company is of
higher quality. But this also signals that
the remaining firms on the exchange are of
lower quality, which encourages the next
best firms to leave that exchange in order to
separate themselves from that pooling equilibrium. This creates a downward spiral that
ends with only the lowest quality firms—
the lemons—left on the venture exchange.

T

he PIA model solves the lemons problem by transferring the quality signal
from the exchange to the PIA. Having a
highly regarded PIA approve a company
sends a strong signal about firm quality even

and specific statutory language demonstrate
that the SEC is authorized to promulgate
Rule 144B.
A 144B safe-harbor exemption—permitting venture exchanges to facilitate
resale of private-company stock, including
crowd-funded securities, where a “private independent analyst” is employed to monitor
and safeguard investments—may solve the
economic problems with these secondary
markets; the successful operation of these
secondary markets is critical for the original-sale exemptions to facilitate efficient
capital formations. Without a resale exemption, small, private-company stockholders

“General legal principles, rulemaking history, and specific
statutory language demonstrate that the SEC is authorized to
promulgate Rule 144B.”
if that firm is trading on an exchange of no
repute. The firm no longer has to leave the
exchange in order to separate itself from low
quality exchange participants because the
144B exchange creates a reputation market
for PIAs as well as firms.
A highlight of this Article’s 144B proposal is that this rule can be promulgated
by the SEC without an act of Congress.
Generally, an agency may implement its
delegated authority through rulemaking.
When Congress explicitly delegates to an
agency rulemaking authority to effectuate
a statute, “[s]uch legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute.” The Exchange Act conferred
broad, open-ended rulemaking authority on
the SEC. The JOBS Act also granted specific rulemaking authority to the SEC to create
new exemptions to securities regulations.
General legal principles, rulemaking history,
[ 21 ] IIT Chicago-Kent Faculty Perspectives

face many disadvantages. Yet a resale exemption subjects those same small stockholders
to the risk of fraud in the market. Therefore,
the solution is to create a resale exemption
that balances sufficient investor protections
with limited disclosure requirements. The
development of liquid, transparent, and
fair 144B exchanges for the transaction of
private-company stock could accomplish
this and thereby facilitate the recycling of
capital and promote the democratization of
startups.
Indeed, the development of multiple
144B exchanges is necessary for efficient
capital formation. Vibrant competition
among exchanges will allow the optimal
combination of disclosure requirements and
investor protection to evolve. Exchanges
should be allowed to experiment with various levels of disclosure requirements and
investors protections, and these exchanges
could also facilitate original-sale transacspring 2016 [ 21 ]
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tions. The result could be a market for stock
markets. Original stock issuers, original
stock purchasers and resale investors could
shop around for the optimal mix of sunlight and efficiency. This flexibility would
help to keep securities regulations from
becoming quickly outdated as the nature
of investment changes. The SEC could retain the right to permit only certain types
of investors into certain markets based on
risk of the exchange, amount of investment,
sophistication of investor, age of the issuing
company, or other factors. The concern for
the SEC is to avoid creating new financial
asymmetries by giving the wealthiest investors exclusive access to the best markets, as it
did with Rule 144A.
Modernizing securities regulation to
protect investors while capitalizing the future of innovative startups requires a deeper
review of the entire body of securities regulation, which is the subject of my future work.
For example, the accredited investor standard, which is based solely on wealth, could
potentially be replaced by a more nuanced
standard of investor sophistication. Modern
technology, like online feedback tools and
reputation networks, could provide novel
solutions to eighty-year-old securities-regu-
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lation problems. The creations of exchanges
like those contemplated by proposed Rule
144B could provide a valuable source of
data that will help scholars and regulators
determine how to modernize other securities regulations.
Seth C. Oranburg
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Unbundling the “Tort” of
Copyright Infringement
By Patrick R. Goold

D

ownload the latest episode of Game of
Thrones from a peer-2-peer network; operate
an Internet TV streaming platform; transfer
eBook files from your computer to your smartphone;
sing Happy Birthday to You in a crowded restaurant;
use Marvin Gaye’s classic Got To Give It Up as inspiration for a modern funk-pop song, and in each case
you commit the ever-expanding tort of copyright infringement. Copyright law grants authors the right to
control their original creative works. Copying a work
without the owner’s permission is tortious. As society’s
ability to generate information increases, the scope of
that tort widens like falcon’s gyre until it touches upon
every life in a rapidly sprawling variety of circumstances. Copyright now regulates such a vast amount
of activity that infringement is one of “today’s most
prevalent form of property tort.” 1 And yet, despite the
growing importance of this tort to the economy, the
legal system, and our lives, the judicial test used to

An excerpt from Unbundling the “Tort” of Copyright Infringement, 102 Virginia Law Review
(forthcoming 2016).
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determine infringement is bemoaned
for its inconsistency and incoherence.
Copyright’s “infringement analysis” is “a
mess”2 which makes “no sense,”3 and is
so complex that it is a “virtual black hole
in copyright jurisprudence.”4

T

he test for copyright infringement
is superficially straightforward, but
in practice beset with doctrinal instability. Technically, proving infringement
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate two
simple epistemic facts: that the defendant
copied expression, and that such copying
lead to the creation of a “substantially
similar” work. Thereafter, the burden
shifts to the defendant to prove that the
copying was non-infringing because it was
in the service of a “fair use.” However, the
process of judging similarity has become
“frustratingly obscure, ambiguous and
confusing,”5 while the fair use doctrine is
now so “exceedingly difficult to predict”6
that some view it as nothing more than
the “right to hire a lawyer.”7 Three particular problems highlight the trouble. First
is the “audience problem.” Who is the
“audience” who gets to judge whether two
works are substantially similar: the intended consumers? the ordinary observer?
experts in the field? Courts go back and
forth between these standards with very
little reasoning. Second is the “harm problem.” The most important question in the
fair use analysis is whether the defendant’s
copying is harmful to the copyright owner. But what qualifies as harm? For some
courts, it is the diversion of third party
demand, for others it is the defendant’s
own failure to pay a license fee. On occasion some courts are even prepared to find
harm when the defendant’s copying disrupts the owner’s non-economic interest
in creative control, privacy, and reputation. And last but not least is the “analogy
problem.” If copyright infringement is a
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tort, then what other torts does it most
resemble? What other parts of private law
can judges look to for guidance on how
to design the infringement analysis? But
while some judges view infringement
as a property tort, and search the law
of trespass and conversion for guiding
principles, others see infringement as a
form of economic tort, and look to unfair
competition as the appropriate model for
designing the infringement test.
	In Unbundling the “Tort” of
Copyright Infringement, I provide a revised positive theory of copyright infringement law which makes the vagaries of the
infringement analysis easier to predict. In
a nutshell, the orthodox theory that copyright infringement is one single tort, and
there is one single infringement analysis,
is incorrect. A more accurate description
is that the term “copyright infringement”
is a group of distinct torts, each with their
own unique infringement analysis. Using
an analytic jurisprudence method, I break
down copyright infringement into five
distinct “copy-torts” and then show how
the infringement analysis changes across
them. Unbundling copyright infringement in this descriptive manner makes
it easier for litigants and practitioners to
predict how courts will apply the infringement analysis, and provides a blueprint
for judges struggling to apply the analysis
in hard cases.
First, the orthodox theory that
copyright infringement is one singular
wrong is incorrect. There is no “tort of
land infringement” but instead a group
of real property torts; there is no “tort of
chattel infringement” but instead a group
of personal property torts; and likewise it
is better to think not of a “tort of copyright infringement” but a group of copyright-based torts. All of these copy-torts
involve copying and the author’s exclusive
right to copy. But the taxonomy reflects
spring 2016 [ 26 ]
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the different interests underlying that
right, and the different ways copying may
injure those interests. The five copy-torts
can be summarized as follows:
1. Consumer Copying occurs when
a consumer accesses the work rather than
negotiating for access in the market.
2. Competitor Copying is committed by rival producers who copy in order
to lure consumers away from the copyright owner.
3. Expressive Privacy Invasion makes
liable those who publish expression the

determine whether the defendant’s copying injures the owner’s legally protected
interest. But because copyright protects
multiple interests from different types of
injury, the infringement analysis simply
cannot provide a one-size-fits-all tool.
Instead, courts take the generic “infringement analysis” (copying + substantial
similarity – fair use = infringement) and
modify its doctrine, and the theory underlying it, so that it provides a unique
legal test for each of the different wrongs.
To illustrate, consider the difference
between “competitor copying” and “consumer copying” cases. The competitor

“[B]ecause copyright protects multiple interests
from different types of injury, the infringement
analysis simply cannot provide a one-size-fits-all
tool.”
owner is trying to keep confidential.
4. Artistic Reputation Injury sanctions copying that causes deterioration of
the owner’s professional reputation.
5. Breach of Creative Control holds
as tortious acts of decision-making that
the law designates to the copyright owner.

S

econd, the infringement analysis that
courts apply is different in each of these
different copy-torts. There is no singular
test for both trespass to land and nuisance,
or for assault and battery, and neither
should lawyers expect courts to create a
uniform test for copyright infringement.
A defendant’s conduct is tortious only if
it interferes with a legally protected interest. Copyright’s infringement analysis
– including both the substantial similarity
and fair use inquiries – is a judicial test to
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copying wrong occurs where a rival producer copies from the copyright owner in
order to produce consumer demand diversion. For example, in creating Blurred
Lines, Robin Thicke and Pharrel Williams
may copy from Marvin Gaye’s Got To
Give It Up because doing so will cause
some consumers to forego buying Gaye’s
song, and to buy Blurred Lines instead.
When copyright owners sue copyists for
this tort, typically courts adopt the intended consumer viewpoint for assessing
similarity and the market substitution
theory of copyright harm. Consumers
will only “switch” between the two works
if they view them as economic substitutes,
and courts typically want some real-world
evidence of the switch before holding the
copyist liable. This is highly similar to
the general unfair competition cause of
action.
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A

lternatively, imagine the copyist in
the case is not Thicke and Williams,
but a college student who downloads
the Gaye song from a p2p site like The
Pirate Bay. The copyright owner’s claim is
no longer like unfair competition – “you
stole my consumers!” – but is more akin
to trespass. The owner’s claim is that she
had the right to exclude individuals from
the protected subject matter, and individuals who wish to access it must do so
through voluntary market negotiation.
Like the trespasser who jumps the fence,
the college student has accessed the song
outside the channels the law desires. In
these cases, whether two works are “substantially similar” is usually subjected to
the “ordinary observer” test. Whether
consumers should pay the owner depends
on the underlying “incentive-access”
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tradeoff. The advantage of the “ordinary
observer” standard is, like the “reasonable
person” standard elsewhere in tort law, it
is a legal fiction. There is no real world
“ordinary observer.” Instead, this doctrine
allows the court to determine whether
this is a case where the consumer must
pay the owner in order to ensure an adequate return for the copyright owner, and
thereafter to label ex post facto the two
works as “substantially similar” according
to the fictitious “ordinary” observer. And,
in the cases where the consumer was under a duty to pay for access, the market
“harm” is the money that she would have
paid had she negotiated for access.
The following table summarizes
precisely how courts modify the test for
copyright infringement depending on
which copy-tort is in question.
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This is the latest in a series of articles
that uses tort theory to help understand
and evaluate modern copyright infringement law. In particular, this project was
inspired by William Prosser’s famous
1961 article, Privacy.8 In that article,
Prosser demonstrated that “privacy invasion” was not one tort, but actually four
different torts. He demonstrated how
distinguishing the four torts not only
made privacy doctrine more predictable,
but also sharpened our awareness of the
underlying policy objectives pursued by
the law. Half a century later, Prosser’s
insight is more relevant than ever in the
context of today’s sprawling copyright
law.
1 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts 251 (2010).
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Competition Law
Convergence
Potential Roles for Economics
By David Gerber

D

iscussions of the future of antitrust law (usually known outside the US as “competition
law”) are often based on assumptions about
the role of economics. Perhaps the most pivotal of
these assumptions is that economics can provide a basis for global competition law convergence. It is pivotal because choices and strategies about the future
shape of global markets and of economic development
often depend on it. A reduction in differences among
these systems—often referred to as “convergence”—is
often seen as the only viable strategy for responding
to the problems and weaknesses of the current legal
framework for global markets. To the extent that this
proposition is accepted, incentives to evaluate or pursue other strategies such as coordination among states
are reduced. Yet the prospects for convergence rest on
assumptions about the role of economics in the convergence process, and these assumptions deserve scrutiny.

A summary of Competition Law Convergence: Potential Roles for Economics, in Comparative
Law and Economics 206, (Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni B. Ramello eds. 2016).
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Competition Law Convergence

T

his Article explores these assumptions
and addresses the issue of how and to
what extent economics can provide a firm
basis for competition law convergence.
Discussions of convergence often proceed
in a kind of abstract haze in which the
science of economics is expected to be
central to global convergence, but they
seldom explain how it can be expected to
play this role. Our effort here is to dispel
some of the haze surrounding this issue
and to suggest a novel and hopefully valuable approach to convergence.
An initial step in this direction is to
clarify the objectives of a convergence
strategy. The basic aim of such a strategy is
to reduce differences among the national
rules governing competition and thereby
reduce the costs of doing business across
borders and improve the efficiency of
global markets. This, in turn, is expected
to provide benefits to consumers in richer
countries and to both producers and consumers in lower income economies. The
stakes involved in pursuing a convergence
strategy are, therefore, high.
The term “convergence” is often used
loosely to refer to reducing differences
among competition law systems, but the
term is too vague. The high stakes involved
in this strategy call for care in identifying
more precisely what the term means and
entails. Literally, the term “convergence”
refers to a process of moving toward a
point (a “convergence point”). Identifying
that point and analyzing the implications
of moving toward it thus become critical
for evaluating the potential of the project.
The Article focuses on these issues. Note
that this analysis refers to voluntary decisions. Decisions that are coerced or required involve different issues and do not
play a part in this analysis.
The Article briefly reviews how the
convergence strategy came to play such
a central role in thinking about the fu-

ture of competition law and of global
markets in general. The “deep” economic
globalization that began in the 1990s is
a key feature of the story. It increasingly
undermined confidence in the jurisdictional system that has long provided the
legal framework for transborder economic
relations. Markets were becoming more
global, but the legal framework was—and
is—provided by individual states unilaterally exercising jurisdiction over conduct
outside their borders. This system increases costs, uncertainty, and inequality in the
operation of global markets.
One response was to seek a coordinated framework through the newly-formed

“The ‘deep’ economic globalization that began in the
1990s is a key feature of the
story.”
World Trade Organization. Although
there was support for this initiative, the
US and some other states preferred convergence as the central response to the
limitations of the jurisdictional system,
and this has led to decades of pursuing
and discussing the convergence strategy.
The Article then reviews the reasons
given to support the claim that economics must be central to competition law
convergence. First, economics is a science
and therefore universal and neutral. It is
not tied to culture or to institutions, and
it does not favor one country or interest
group over others. Second, it can be applied anywhere and is therefore global
in scope. And third, the economics profession has become an international profession in which the methods of analysis
are followed everywhere. There is also a
political factor. Economics has become
central to competition law in the US and
to a growing degree in much of Europe,
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and therefore convergence will have to
be based on what these countries do and
what they would accept.
The claim that economics must be
central to the process can easily obscure,
however, all-important issues about
HOW it can be expected to play that role.
The Article reveals that undifferentiated
assumptions about the role of economics
are not only likely to create uncertainty
and impose costs, but also to distort decisions about policy for dealing with these
pressing problems. Meaningful analysis
requires careful exploration of what is converging toward what, why, and with what
consequences. To claim, for example, that
decision makers are converging or should
converge toward “more economics” is too
vague to be of analytical value.
I suggest that distinguishing among
the roles or functions of economics in
competition law and identifying the
convergence potential of each role as well
as its implications provides a potentially
valuable form of analysis. For each role we
look at several questions. First, to what
extent is there cognitive alignment among
the participants in the process? What
do the decision makers know about the
relevant issues? Do they share common
knowledge about and understanding of
economics? Second, to what extent is
there institutional/procedural alignment?
Are the institutions and procedures of
countries involved in the process sufficiently similar that the abstract principles
of economic analysis will be translated
into decisions in similar ways? Finally,
what are the incentives for the decision
makers to move toward a particular convergence point?
The Article applies this analysis to
three basic roles that economics plays in
competition law. One is descriptive. As a
social science, the primary tasks of economics are to explain phenomena and to
[ 34 ] IIT Chicago-Kent Faculty Perspectives

interpret economic data. Using economics
for descriptive purposes is, therefore, generally attractive to decision makers, and if
economics is increasingly used for these
purposes in many jurisdictions, there may
be some indirect effect on convergence.
The Article points out, however, that such
an effect would necessarily be indirect
and limited, and that increased use of
economics may have the opposite effect.
A second use of economics is normative. It is the primary focus of convergence discussions. Here the claim is
that economics should provide the norms
or standards of conduct for competition
law—i.e., that the central question in all
competition law systems should be whether conduct is “anticompetitive” according
to economic analysis. If all competition
law systems were to do this, it is claimed, a
global standard would emerge that would
reduce the potential harms inherent in
the jurisdictional framework. The Article
looks closely at this claim, identifies its
potential, and notes its limitations and
the risks associated with it.
Economic science can also provide,
however, another point of convergence
that deserves attention—its role in supplying methods of analysis. Here the claim
is that increased use of basic economic
methods can discipline decision making in
ways that foster convergence. This form of
convergence does not necessarily require
particular outcomes, nor does it dictate
that economics provides the standards of
conduct to be enforced by competition
law. It does, however, impose standards on
the decision-making process that limit the
range of justifiable outcomes and thereby
decrease the range of deviation among
competition law systems. This makes it
adaptable to the needs, goals and resources of each jurisdiction, which in turn
increases incentives for decision makers to
move in this direction. Each such move

Competition Law Convergence

increases convergence.
Economic globalization has led to increased awareness of the weaknesses of the
current legal framework for transnational
competition, and convergence provides at
least a partial response to those weaknesses. The importance of economic science
in competition law makes it an important
element of any discussion of convergence.
Loose references and unfounded assumptions about the roles that economics can
and should play in competition law convergence can, however, cloud and distort
discussions of the issues. This can, in turn,
impede the development not only of competition law, but also of global markets and
economic development around the globe.
As this Article shows, careful attention
to the specific roles that economics can
play in convergence reveals that, if used
appropriately, it can contribute much to
improving the legal framework of global
competition.
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